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Spatializing Law in a Comparative Perspective  
of Legal History
Jean-Louis Halpérin
How to justify, at the end of this volume, a comparative point of view from 
an outsider who is not a specialist of Chinese legal history? A irst argument can 
be found in the recent developments of comparative legal history. A European 
Society for Comparative Legal History has been founded in 2009 and has 
gathered many legal historians in Europe who are trying to work together 
about journals, handbooks or casebooks in a transnational perspective. 1 
The Max-Planck Institutfür europäische Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt am 
Main has devoted a symposium and an issue of the review Rechtsgeschichte 
(2014) to the transnational perspectives of legal history today, including in 
territories outside Europe, especially in Asia. 2 In this Institute, Thomas 
Duve has particularly focused collective research works about the colonial 
or quasi-colonial situations that have given birth to transplanted or hybrid 
rules. 3 Legal Historians are more and more sensitive to the narrowly-tailored 
tradition of their discipline based on national frames and, for a long time, on 
nationalistic biases. They are more and more prone to study legal circulations 
among the national systems, to take account of the relationships between the 
centre of legal traditions and the periphery and to considerer colonial law as 
an important component of legal developments since the 16th century. 4 It 
can be said that forty years after the pioneering and discussed works of Alan 
Watson concerning legal transplants, 5 legal history has known a hermeneutical 
1. Three volumes of the review Comparative Legal History have been edited by the 
ESCLH since 2013. 
2. Rechtsgeschichte. Legal History Rg, 22, 2014 with, for example, a paper of Li 2014 
and a paper of Zhang 2014.
3. Duve 2014.
4. Halpérin et al. 2014: 183-203.
5. Watson 1974 and 1977.
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turn towards a study of interactions and relationships between legal systems. 
Legal history is no more conceived as the study of the development of national 
systems that would be linked with national spirits and cultures. On the contrary, 
there is a reaction against stereotypes and unhistorical “clichés” concerning 
the traditional features or characters attributed to legal orders or families. 
The inluence of legal pluralism, even if it is less or more accepted by legal 
historians, is not without impact on these new perspectives of combining legal 
history and comparative law.
A second argument, that is more personal than the precedent, concerns the 
methodological relection in legal theory as it can be applied to historical issues. 
Although all legal historians do not share this opinion, it seems to me that legal 
history, as history in general, is a viewpoint moving back from the present to 
the past. Our questions and problems are conceived from nowadays issues and 
expressed with our contemporary vocabulary. As many legal historians have 
received the education of a jurist, they use the words and the concepts of their 
national system and language, and more generally of modern law. Of course, 
they know that the past legal rules they are studying were often foreign to these 
modern schemes of thinking. But they cannot think “as a lawyer of the past” 
and resurrect the way of thinking of persons who died several centuries ago. 
As a consequence, every study in legal history involves a comparison between 
the past and the present, between the issues we are studying in “ancient law” 
and the questions we are asking in our modern vocabulary linked with our 
knowledge of our legal system. As Joseph Raz has noticed, we are using our 
concept of law, dependent on the observer, to study foreign or past systems of 
law. 6
As a positivist, I think that it is necessary for studying law (and specially 
the legal rules of the past) to get a minimal deinition of law, which means 
a distinction between legal norms and other kinds of norms. I follow the 
method used by Herbert Hart or by Joseph Raz to ind these unique features 
or characters of law not in the content of norms (what leads to natural law 
conceptions, identifying law with ideals of justice), but in formalist criteria 
that make law differ from other normative systems. It means that law, as a 
technology, has been ignored by some societies and has been invented in 
historical conigurations that can be identiied. The attempt made by Hart to 
identify these criteria, as three secondary rules (of recognition, change, and 
adjudication) associated with primary rules to constitute a legal system, 7 
seems to be the more convincing and more operating method in legal history. 
6. Raz 2009: 17-46.
7. Hart 1961: 93-95.
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It provides the advantage not to be dependent of the traditional, sometimes 
questionable, translations of foreign and past words into our legal vocabulary 
(for example, considering that the Hindu dharmasastras are equivalent to 
law). According to Hart, a legal system is not only a set of rules of conduct 
(that can be found in other normative systems), but these “primary rules” must 
be completed by three adjective or procedural rules (or group of rules, it is 
not necessary that every secondary rule could be resumed in one sentence or 
would be expressed by the contemporaries). The rule of recognition allows to 
acknowledge what is an authoritative rule imposed by the rulers to the ruled. 
The rule of change determines who can amend the rules and which process 
should be followed for that. The rule of adjudication gives the power to judges 
for deciding litigation about the primary rules. Hart has considered that the 
writing down of primary rules (generally with an express order to obey them 
and an information given to judges) is a irst step in the establishment of a rule 
of recognition.
If one uses Hart’s scheme, it is possible to make a difference, in Antiquity, 
between the legal system of the Romans—with the presence of the three 
secondary rules from the age of the Law of the Twelve Tables (middle of the 
ifth century B.C.)—and normative regulations which have been assimilated to 
law through tradition but are not likely to be recognized as law because they 
lack the three secondary rules. In the Western world, one can consider not only 
that Romans have invented law, but that they were not preceded by Egyptians, 
Greeks or Mesopotamians whose regulative systems cannot be identiied as 
law before the ifth century B.C., as Aldo Schiavone has recently shown. 8 It 
can be reproached to Hart’s scheme to be ethno-centred and available only 
for Western (or Westernized) systems of law. The Chinese experience is the 
best example of a useful comparison based on these formal criteria. Among 
specialists, there is no doubt today that there was, since the Antiquity, a rule 
of recognition (about what constituted the fa), a rule of change (thanks to the 
succession of different statutes in the same kingdom, then in the uniied empire) 
and a rule of adjudication (through a system of public courts) associated with 
the rules of conduct that were sanctioned by penalties. If one adds that Chinese 
law, like Roman law, was not strongly linked with a religious system supposing 
the divine origin of laws, the Chinese legal systems appears more comparable 
to the Roman one than to the religious “normativities” of the so-called Jewish 
or Islamic laws.
The archaeological excavations since the years 1970s, notably the discovery 
of many bamboo tables in the tombs dealing with penal statutes or cases, leads 
8. Schiavone 2005: 5.
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to the identiication of the age of the law’s invention in China between the 
sixth and the third century B.C., irstly inside the Warring States, then in the 
Qin Empire. 9 The fact that this period corresponds to the chronology of the 
invention of law in Rome, and probably in the Jewish world with the writing 
down of the Torah attributed to Ezra the scribe, is a pure coincidence. Hart’s 
criteria allow to consider that the legal technology has been invented separately 
(and used in different ways) in various places of the world. Such a method has 
also led to reject Max Weber’s conceptions about an imperfect development of 
law in ancient China that would be linked with the “absence of lawyers”. 10 On 
the contrary, it can be said that Chinese have invented the law in the Far East 
and, from the Qin dynasty onwards, constructed a strong legal system based on 
statutory laws and on codes. Speaking of a “Chinese State” from the Antiquity 
is not an abuse of language but a justiied recognition of the construction of a 
Chinese legal order that can be assimilated with a State (and with a centralized 
one) according to Kelsen’s theories. 11
For all these reasons, there are some questions linked with the invention 
of law and the construction of States (then their transformation in “modern” 
States) that are common to legal historians of the Western world and of China. 
For example, the relationship between “military” and “civil” law is likely to 
concern the historians of Roman law as well as those of Chinese law. 12 In this 
volume, the various contributions are focused on law during the Ming and 
Qing dynasties and the subject for comparative legal history is not the one of 
the invention of the law. The main problem is the spatial application of legal 
rules in relationship with the conquests of new territories during the 17th and 
the 18th century.
What is well known by the specialists of Chinese history, the transition 
from the Ming Empire of the eighteen provinces to the conquests of the 
emperor Qianlong (1735-1796) in the West of China (paciication of Xinjiang, 
campaigns in Burma, Tibet and Vietnam), appears to outsiders as something 
comparable with the development of new colonial empires in the 18th and 
19th centuries (the British empire in India, the Russian empire in Turkestan). 
If a Western point of view has linked colonization with overseas territories and 
with the history of “the age of great discoveries,” it seems possible to make 
new taxonomies about the imperial sovereignty. What is common (or at least 
comparable) between the Chinese, the British and the Russian empires during 
9. Liu 1998; Chang 2007: 335.
10. Bourgon 2007: 241-58.
11. Gernet 2006: vol. 1.
12. Yates 2009: 23-41.
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the 18th and the 19th century (and one part of the 20th century) is the extension 
of a legal system conceived irst as a domestic (or “municipal” as Blackstone 
said for the common law in his 1765-1769 Commentaries) to heterogeneous 
peoples who had their own customs (as regulative rules for their societies) 
and in some cases their own legal norms. As the British colonizers have 
“recognized” the status of personal laws for Muslims and Hindus (what was 
easier for the irst category, endowed with a structured normativity, than for the 
second group, deprived from a true “Hindu law”), the Chinese conquerors had 
to resolve the questions of the law applicable to Mongol or Uyghur tribes, to 
Hui or Miao people. The Chinese were confronted with the tensions between a 
codiied Han law —the one of the 1646 Qing Code, then of the 1740 Code of 
the Great Qing (with the integration of li as true statutes put on an equal footing 
with lü)— Muslim law (as applied by some of the subjected peoples) and 
personal customs. Jérôme Bourgon has shown how it is dificult to speak about 
“custom” and “customary law” in a centralized legal system as the Chinese 
one, which was based on statutes applied by imperial judges. In such a system 
there was no speciic room for “local” customary law linked with a territory 
or a determined group of people. To avoid any confusion between law and 
facts (what is the goal of legal theory for positivists and do not prevent from 
recognizing a gap between “law in books” and “law in action”), it is useful, let 
alone necessary, to prohibit the word “custom” in order to qualify legal practices 
as the ones resulting from the case law. 13 Such a methodological cautiousness is 
not inconsistent with the recognition of local or customary laws in the Chinese 
colonized “Far West”. The problems linked with colonial empires are those 
of the obstacles to a quick and complete integration of heterogeneous peoples 
in a uniied legal system. In all the empires, these problems were resolved 
in admitting (according to different patterns) a “layered” sovereignty with a 
spatialization of norms including some kinds of “personal” status. 14
For these reasons, all the papers gathered in this volume can suggest some 
comparisons with colonial situations concerning the European empires in the 
18th and 19th centuries. Some of these empires have known a rather strong 
system of statutory laws, others were based on a complex of statutory and 
case law. One thinks about France for the irst ideal-type: even before the 
Napoleonic codiication, which was applied in overseas territories only for 
colonizers, the French monarchy knew large statutes, as the 1667 and 1670 




ordinances of Louis the fourteenth concerning civil and penal procedures. 15 
Great Britain is of course the kingdom of a common law based on case law, 
but with a complex web of penal statutes developed in the 18th century, at the 
same time than the recognition of Muslim and Hindu personal laws in India. 
If the legal frame, as the administrative one, is different in China, one can 
understand that the concepts of “local laws”, “personal laws” or adaptations 
of law linked with a very large space are elements of a fruitful comparison 
between the Chinese and the European (and colonial) situations.
Let us take, in a irst stage, the problems that were caused by the great 
distance between the centre and the periphery of the empire. The dificulties, 
described by Xie Xin-zhe, to realise autopsies according to the legal rules 
(what means in a short delay), in the most remote parts of judges districts can 
be compared with other conigurations in legal history. How Roman governors 
could be informed and moved in action for cases happening at the limits of 
their province? How French judges of the Parliament of Toulouse could lead 
criminal investigations in some parts of the Pyrenean mountains? How British 
administrators (and colonial judges) could control legal situations in the 
furthest parts of their district? 16
The question of penal banishment in the Chinese empire, as examined in 
Frederic Constant’s paper, is also signiicant of the many attempts to transform 
the medieval forms of banishment outside a rather small territory (which were 
not very eficient in a modern State) into “modern” systems of transportation in 
the galleys (in France during the 17th and the 18th centuries corresponding to 
the period of the irst Qing emperors), then in penal colonies (specially for the 
British in America, then in Australia). Of course, the situation is not the same 
for continental empires, like the Chinese and the Russian ones (with Siberia 
as a huge space for penal banishment) and for maritime empires. But, in both 
cases, spatialization of the law of punishment does not mean a diversity of 
local laws (it is the same law that is applied inside the whole empire) but the 
determination of zones where peoples are concentrated (and sometimes used 
for military goals) according to a penal (and legal) status.
Another issues concern the establishment of local or personal laws in the 
penal ield. Eric Schluessel shows how governors could be empowered to 
decide local rulings, notably for making immediate executions (executions 
on the spot) of death penalties, contrary to the fundamental rule of Chinese 
law requiring the conirmation of death penalties by the emperor. Here again, 
15. It is noteworthy that the Qing Code of the same period was a true penal code, which 
lacked in France.
16. Some of these questions are dealt with in the memoirs of John Beames 1984.
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the substantial rule is the same for the whole empire (the same offences are 
punished with the death penalty), but the deterrent goal (also present in the 
penal exile) of the penalty is linked (as in Beccaria’s treatise) with a swift 
execution at the place of the crime. These local rules can be interpreted as well 
as forms of “lexibility” in a centralized system and as kinds of “martial laws” 
used in conquered territories.
A third stage can be analysed as speciic local and penal rules adapted to 
non-Han peoples. The “law of the Miaos”, studied by Zhang Ning, is a part 
of the 1740 Code with about twenty speciic sub-statutes. These statutes are 
focused on special crimes, notably the trafic of human beings linked with the 
revenge (or vendetta) and compensation traditions among the Miaos. One can 
observe that the Chinese statutory law targeted an ethnic group for a “supra-
provincial crime” (comparable to interstate criminality in federal states). It is 
not properly a personal law recognizing Miaos’ practices as a customary law 
(on the contrary, the Miaos were punished to act according their social habits), 
but a local law that let the Chinese State maintain and control forms of slavery. 
In the same time, one can ask if these speciic statutes, submitting the more 
serious offences to imperial laws (and even to the emperor’s approbation for 
sentences involving the death penalty), were not an accommodation with the 
“civil” rules that Chinese judges could deduce from Miao customs in cases 
between two Miao litigants. Here a comparison would be possible with the 
decline of personal penal laws in Western colonial empires (as well in British 
India as in French Algeria) and the recognition of a personal “civil” law in 
family matters.
Whang Zhiqiang speaks deliberately of “regional sub-statutes” about the 
217 penal rules that are assigned to a particular territory. Some of these regional 
statutes concerned the capital of the empire and reinforced the special status of 
the centre of the empire, as the regulations applied to London or Paris were not 
inconsistent with uniied legal system. But many others concerned the periphery 
of the empire and were initiated by speciic demands from the governors of 
remote provinces. Here a comparison can be made with the rescripts of the 
Roman governors that were addressed to the emperor’s chancellery and were 
answered by imperial jurists attempting in some situations to accommodate 
Roman law with speciic habits of the indigenous inhabitants. 17 Because many 
of these statutes applicable to indigenous populations at the periphery of the 
empire were more severe than the ordinary legislation, one can also think 
about the so-called Code de l’indigénat—in fact not a comprehensive code, 




the different French colonies, notably for authorizing administrative detention 
and forced work in cases of disobedience 18. But this last comparison is limited: 
the indigenat regime was part of a kind of administrative law outside the 
penal codiication, whereas the Chinese have integrated these speciic laws in 
their unique codiication. Furthermore, the persons affected by these regional 
rules could be recognized as an ethnic group (that is not exactly the same 
as colonized subjects) and there are some contacts with the kind of “foreign 
laws” recognized by the Chinese rules, as the Mongol Code, the regulations for 
Turkestan or the so-called “Fan code”.
This Fan Code is the subject of Max Oidtmann’s paper through the study of 
a litigation dealing with domains of lamas and monasteries in Amdo (province 
of Gansu). In this territory the Chinese rulers have subjected populations, which 
have known the 1640 Mongol-Oirat code and which were later separated from 
their former Mongol rulers. Having the conviction that Fan people were too 
barbarous to have their own legal system, the Chinese colonizers considered 
that they could extract a “Fan law” from the Mongol statutes. Chinese rulers 
acted in consultations with Tibetan and Mongol elites and promulgated, as a 
kind of privilege, sixty-eight statutes translated in Tibetan language. Named as 
the Fan’s “own customs”, these statutes were rather a set of imperial laws that 
were applicable locally to all the inhabitants of a region, the Mongols as well 
as the Tibetans. The process consisting in recognizing as laws some indigenous 
norms and in translating into a vernacular language “foreign” norms written 
in another language can be compared with the British translations of Persian 
or Hindu texts that were in a second stage imposed to Muslims or Hindus in 
India. 19 But the Fan Code is more a regional law than a personal status and it 
seems to have been accepted (and even claimed) by the local communities of 
Tibetans. However, these local laws remained imperial statutes and were not 
autonomous regulations decided by a regional power. The comparison between 
Whang Zhiqiang’s study of special (penal) laws, integrated in the Code, and 
this Fan Code admitting compensations instead of penalties is the proof of 
a variety of policies from the Chinese rulers to adapt their legal system to 
different colonial situations.
The same remark can be made about military law in imperial China as 
studied by John Gregory. First, there is a great continuity between Chinese 
dynasties in dealing with military law: if there is a clear policy to have special 
statutes and militarized (what means more accelerated) adjudication for 
18. Merle 2006: 97-115.
19. Bhattacharyya-Panda 2008; for a general problematic about these processes of 
inventing customary laws, Halpérin 2012: 405-23.
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military offences, this military law was part of the code and some military 
crimes were subjected to the ordinary retrial-review process. Military law 
was not associated with an arbitrary power of Chinese warriors, but used as a 
“regular” law. Second, this military law was applied in the same time during the 
conquest of new territories and for the administration of colonized provinces 
by governors of the frontiers. As the Qing were Manchu conquerors of China 
(ighting against Southern Ming in the 17th century), then colonizers of huge 
territories in the West (during the 18th century), the areas subjected to military 
laws were expanded (and not limited to extreme frontiers) during the 17th and 
18th centuries. Military law cannot be qualiied as an exception or something 
to get round the legal rules. It is a part of nuanced policies to subject territories 
to the Chinese legal system.
For all these reasons, the different ways for spatializing the law in the 
modern history of imperial China can be analysed as structural reforms of an 
old and sophisticated legal system rather than exceptions to the rule of law. 
China has known, as other countries especially in Europe between the 17th and 
the 19th centuries, situations of political urgency and of legal emergency. The 
case of Lin Zexu’s action against the British opium trade is well known, but Lin 
Zexu was dismissed and his policy was not approved by central authorities. In 
the longue durée, one can be struck by the will of Chinese rulers to “regularize” 
all the practises linked with a special treatment of legal rules according to 
the territory or the population. If these attempts to adapt the Chinese legal 
system cannot be reduced to a single policy, they can be described as elements 
of a voluntary plan to make the Chinese legal system consistent with a new 
territorial empire, including more and more no-Han peoples.
With such a perspective, the Chinese legal history could be studied, in 
comparison with Western polities and empires, as an example of the legal 
transformation of the State. As I have said, one can consider that there is a 
legal order and a State apparatus in China since the foundations of the empire, 
what means a long time before the apparition of “States” in the Western world. 
If the invention of law in China and in Rome were not very far in time one from 
another, the transformation of the republican city of Rome in a bureaucratic 
empire did not happen before the second and third century A.D., whereas the 
Chinese empire was organized with a powerful apparatus from the third century 
B.C. Of course, the two spaces, the Western and the Chinese ones, have known 
long periods of weakness, and even of disappearance, of the State legal and 
political structures. If we consider the situation at the beginning of the Qing 
dynasty, there is again no doubt about the existence of a Chinese State, notably 
with the centralization of justice and the review process of death penalties 
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before the emperor. The question is to determine if the Chinese empire has 
known the mutation towards what we call in Occident a “modern State”.
For a long time, it has been considered that the Qing Empire was relatively 
weak in its structures in order to explain its defeats towards foreign powers 
that begun with the Opium War. There is today a clear re-evaluation of a “peak 
of power” of the Qing Empire during the 18th century 20. If one combines this 
analysis with Lauren Benton’s theories concerning the speciicities of empires 
towards ordinary States (that is to say States without great territorial extensions 
during the Modern Times), it seems possible to develop an hypothesis about 
the features of many modern States in the Western world as in China. In a 
legal perspective, traditional States were based on a control of the judiciary by 
the central institutions and a hierarchy of courts: it was the case for medieval 
States in Europe like England or France, for Muslim States at the epoch of the 
Abbasid Caliphate, for the Church at the climax of pontiical theocracy and 
for the Chinese Empire during the Ming Dynasty. For all the States which 
conquered and controlled new territories overseas (the Spanish, Portuguese, 
Dutch, English and French States in Europe) or in a “far” east (Prussia, 
Russia), south (Ottoman Empire) or west (China), there were new legal needs 
to develop a more complex and layered structure. If all these empires could be 
more or less centralized, the increasing problems of legal spatialization in vast 
and various areas led to the idea of developing personal laws and of letting a 
margin of autonomy to governors at the periphery. In many cases the colonizers 
were confronted with heterogeneous peoples endowed with their own customs, 
let alone with a different legal system as the Muslim one (and Chinese rulers 
encountered the Islamic law as well as European colonizers). The recognition 
of “personal status” and the transformation of indigenous customs into 
customary laws (integrated in the whole system) were “economic” solutions to 
control new subjects without renouncing to impose the law of the conquerors.
All the studies in this volume are focusing about these different means to 
develop a modern State in China during the Qing dynasty. The use of sub-
statutes, special laws, military laws or customary rules recognized by the 
judges was a path towards what we call a “hierarchy of norms”. In the same 
code, it was clear that the purely Chinese laws (as a kind of “public policy”) 
were superior to all the local rules, even if these special rules could derogate 
to the general ones.
As Ulrich Theobald has shown in his paper, the common feature between 
administrative regulations and judicial precedents is the creation of local 
regulations that were embedded in a comprehensive legal order. In the absence 
20. Waley-Cohen 2004: 193-206.
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of any movement of legal protestation —as the one of American insurgents 
who did no more support to be subjected to “subordinated constitutions” in 
the British Empire— one must wait the end of the Qing Dynasty in China to 
imagine the writing down of a central constitution and of several provincial 
constitutions. Contrary to the pluralistic conceptions, this complexiication of 
the legal order was not the result of “spontaneous” customary resisting to the 
centralisation, but a consequence of State policies letting a small room for 
customary or local rules. If one adds that these legal constructions depended 
on various practices and precedents in the different parts of the empire, it is 
understandable that the Chinese lawyers did not get a word for “custom” before 
the contacts with Western and Japanese jurists 21. The comparison between 
legal history in the Western world and in Asia is the proof that we can use 
and discuss an analytical concept of law and confront it with a great array of 
empirical data without being prisoners of Europe-centred prejudices.
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